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Extending the Limits of Judicial Review of 
Regulatory Orders: Committee of Consumer 
Services v. Public Service Commission 
The scope of judicial review for regulatory orders issued by 
the Utah Public Service Commission (commission) is very nar- 
row. Utah statutory and case law direct the state supreme court 
to reverse a commission order only if it is not supported by evi- 
dence and is thus arbitrary and capricious.' Moreover, the court 
should not substitute its judgment for that of the commission 
even if it considers the commission's action to be u n ~ i s e . ~  How- 
l. The Utah Code Annotated provides for judicial review of the commission's orders 
as follows: 
The review shall not be extended further than to determine whether the com- 
mission has regularly pursued its authority, including a determination of 
whether the order or decision under review violates any right of the petitioner 
under the Constitution of the United States or of the state of Utah. The find- 
ings and conclusions of the commission on questions of fact shall be final and 
shall not be subject to review. Such question of fact shall include ultimate facts 
and the findings and conclusions of the commission on reasonableness and 
discrimination. 
UTAH CODE ANN. 8 54-7-16 (1953). This statute has been extensively interpreted; repre- 
sentative of the case law on the subject is Lewis v. Wycoff Co., 18 Utah 2d 255,420 P.2d 
264 (1966), wherein the court stated: 
Due to the responsibility imposed upon the Commission, and its presumed 
knowledge and expertise in this field, its findings and order are supported by 
certain well-recognized rules of review: They are endowed with a presumption 
of validity and correctness; and the burden is upon the plaintiff to show that 
they are in error. We survey the evidence in the light most favorable to sus- 
taining them; and we will not reverse unless there is no reasonable basis 
therein to support them so that it appears that the Commission's action was 
capricious and arbitrary. 
Id. at  259, 420 P.2d a t  266 (footnote omitted). See also Utah State Bd. of Regents v. 
Utah Pub. Sew. Comm'n, 583 P.2d 609 (Utah 1978); Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Public 
Sew. Comm'n, 547 P.2d 199 (Utah 1976); Williams v. Public Sew. Comm'n, 29 Utah 2d 
9,504 P.2d 34 (1972); Fuller-Toponce Truck Co. v. Public Sew. Comm'n, 99 Utah 28,96 
P.2d 722 (1939). Many other jurisdictions have a similar standard of judicial review for 
regulatory orders. See, e.g., Northwest Elec. Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 321 U.S. 119 
(1944); D.C. Transit Sys., Inc. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 292 F.2d 734 (D.C. Cir. 1961); 
Village of Maywood v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 23 Ill. 2d 447,178 N.E.2d 345 (1961); 
Almeida Bus Lines, Inc. v. Department of Pub. Util., 348 Mass. 331, 203 N.E.2d 556 
(1965); Corporation Comm'n v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 591 P.2d 711 (Okla. 1979). 
2. PBI Freight Serv. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 598 P.2d 1352 (Utah 1979); Utah 
Parks Co. v. Kent Frost Canyonland Tours, 19 Utah 2d 252,430 P.2d 171 (1967); Lewis 
v. Wycoff Co., 18 Utah 2d 255,420 P.2d 264 (1966). See also American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. ' 
United States, 299 U.S. 232 (1936); Giles Lowery Stockyards, Inc. v. Department of 
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ever, in Committee of Consumer Services u. Public Service 
Commissions (Wexpro), the Utah Supreme Court reversed a 
Utah Public Service Commission order4 that would have allowed 
Mountain Fuel Supply Company, a natural gas utility, to trans- 
fer its non-utility oil assets to Wexpro Company, a wholly owned 
sub~idiary.~ This transfer would have placed those assets outside 
the reach of utility consumers for purposes of determining gas 
rates. 
In 1935, five companies merged to form Mountain Fuel Sup- 
ply Company. Four of these companies produced gas and one 
produced oil.. From its inception Mountain Fuel maintained its 
oil properties in a separate, non-utility account.' The commis- 
sion approved this accounting procedure and repeatedly ruled 
that it did not have jurisdiction over these non-utility acco~nts .~ 
Producing wells were determined to be either utility or non-util- 
ity assets through Mountain Fuel's classification system. When a 
producing well was discovered, this system calculated the mar- 
ket value of both oil and gas at the wellhead to determine 
whether the well was predominantly gas or predominantly oil. 
After this determination was made, the well was capitalized as a 
utility asset if predominantly gas or as a non-utility asset if 
predominantly oil.. If the well turned out to be a dry hole, the 
Agriculture, 565 F.2d 321 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 957 (1977). 
3. 595 P.2d 871 (Utah 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1014 (1980). This case is popu- 
larly known as Wexpro. 
4. Utah P.S.C. Case No. 76-057-14 (April 11, 1978). 
5. 595 P.2d at 873. 
6. Id. a t  881 (Wilkins, J., dissenting). 
Essentially gas was categorized as that hydrocarbon product which was cap- 
able, after contaminants and liquids were removed, of being placed in a natural 
gas pipeline for transmission and distribution. Oil was defined as all other 
hydrocarbon products which before or after treatment were, under industry 
standards, normally sold and transferred in a container or tank and delivered 
to a refinery. 
Id. 
7. See Prefiled Testimony and Exhibits of Mountain Fuel Supply Company and 
Wexpro Company, Testimony of J. Crawford, Jr., Utah P.S.C. Case No. 76-057-14 (April 
11, 1978) (on remand before the Utah Public Service Commission). If these assets had 
been placed in a utility account, they would have been included in the ratebase, thus 
lowering the consumer's cost of natural gas. 
8. Utah P.S.C. Case No. 6369 (Feb. 17, 1972); Utah P.S.C. Case No. 5907 (July 16, 
1968); Utah P.S.C. Case No. 4392 (Feb. 21, 1957); Utah P.S.C. Case No. 3972 (Nov. 24, 
1953); Utah P.S.C. Case No. 3275 (June 30, 1948). Utility assets are subject to regula- 
tions promulgated by the commission. 595 P.2d at 881. 
9. Utah P.S.C. Case No. 76-057-14 at 14. 
When a well was capitalized, none of the costs associated with its development were 
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drilling costs were fully expensed in the year incurred.1° These 
expenses, along with delay rentals and abandoned leases, were 
included in the ratebasell and thereby charged to gas consum- 
ers. The commission, in three separate orders, allowed these ex- 
penses to be so included. However, this inclusion was condi- 
tional; the commission stated that it would allow the rate payers 
to be charged these exploration expenses only as long as the cost 
of gas resulting from Mountain Fuel's exploration program was 
less expensive than purchases from outside producers.12 
Before 1972 the non-utility oil revenues were relatively in- 
significant in comparison to the natural gas revenues." However, 
major oil discoveries by Mountain Fuel in 1972 coupled with 
1973 OPEC price jumps greatly increased the significance of oil 
revenues." This increase prompted consumer groups to seek the 
inclusion of non-utility oil revenues in the utility ratemaking 
process.16 Such an inclusion would have significantly reduced the 
price of natural gas for consumers. The commission refused to 
include the oil revenues in the ratebase until January 14, 1974, 
when it ordered that the oil properties be "rolled in."16 Because 
this order would result in a smaller return on their investments, 
Mountain Fuel shareholders began a massive dumping of stock, 
charged directly to an expense account. Rather, these costs were applied to an asset 
account and depreciated over the life of the asset. 595 P.2d at 876. 
10. Generally accepted accounting principles in the area of oil and gas exploration 
require costs associated with unsuccessful wells to be treated as an expense item rather 
than a capital item. 
11. 595 P.2d at 875. Moat of the exploration expenses were charged to the ratebase 
until 1972 when the commission required the non-utility account to contribute $300,000 
of the annual exploration expense. Utah P.S.C. Case No. 6369 (Feb. 17, 1972). In 1974 
this amount was increased to 32.88% of the total expense. Utah P.S.C. Case No. 6668 
(Jan. 21, 1974). In 1975 the non-utility share was increased to 50% of the total. Utah 
P.S.C. Case No. 7113 (Aug. 15, 1975). No petitions for commission rehearing or judicial 
review were filed on any of these orders. 595 P.2d at 883 (Wilkins, J., dissenting). 
12. Utah P.S.C. Case No. 76-057-14 (April 11, 1978); Utah P.S.C. Case No. 5907 
(July 16,1968); Utah P.S.C. Case No. 4797 (Feb. 17,1960). In the 1968 case, the commis- 
sion said that a "vigorous exploration and development program should be continued so 
long as the costs incurred in developing new supplies of gas are lower than the average 
cost of purchased gas." Utah P.S.C. Case No. 5907 at 8. These orders were not appealed 
and therefore became final. UTAH CODE ANN. 5 54-7-16 (1953). Final orders are not sub- 
ject to collateral attack. UTAH CODE ANN. § 54-7-14 (1953). 
13. 595 P.2d at 882 (Wilkins J., dissenting). 
14. Id. 
15. For an explanation of the rate-making process, see L. NASH, PUBLIC UTILITIES 
(1933); R. W H ~ N ,  PUBLIC UTILITIES (1912); Fenton & Stone, Cost Allocations and Rate 
Structure: Concepts and Misconceptions, 106 PUB. Urn. FORT. 15 (1980). 
16. Utah P.S.C. Case No. 6668 (Jan. 14, 1974). 
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causing the New York Stock Exchange to suspend trading in the 
company's stock.'' On January 21, 1974, the commission held 
that it would not enforce its January 14 order requiring the "roll 
in" of oil revenues.18 However, the commission left its earlier 
findings intact; thus, the future status of the oil assets remained 
uncertain.'. This uncertainty caused considerable insecurity and 
unrest among shareholders and compelled Mountain Fuel to at- 
tempt to transfer its non-utility accounts and assets to a wholly 
owned subsidiary, Wexpro C ~ m p a n y . ~  Consumer groups vigor- 
ously opposed this- transfer because it would place the oil 
revenues permanently beyond their grasp. In spite of this oppo- 
sition, the commission reversed ita January 14 order" and held 
that the transfer of non-utility assets to Wexpro was not within 
its jurisdiction. The crux of the jurisdictional question was 
Mountain Fuel's oil and gas classification system, which classi- 
fied Wexpro's assets as non-utility. The commission explicitly 
upheld this system, and therefore concluded that it did not have 
j~risdiction.~~ 
On appeal the Utah Supreme Court reversed. Writing for 
the majority, Justice Maughan espoused two theories that 
granted the commission jurisdiction over Mountain Fuel's oil as- 
sets. The first theory rests on a construction of the statute 
granting the commission jurisdiction to regulate certain activi- 
ties and industries. Justice Maughan quoted part of a Utah stat- 
ute which defines a public utility8 as follows: 
[Wlhen any person or corporation performs any such service 
for or delivers any such commodity to any public utility herein 
17. 595 P.2d at 883 (Wilkins, J., dissenting). 
18. Utah P.S.C. Case No. 6668 (Jan. 21, 1974). 
19. 595 P.2d at 883 (Wilkins, J., dissenting). 
20. Justice Wilkins related the following facts: 
Regulatory jurisdiction over the non-utility operations has continued to be 
at  issue in every Mountain Fuel rate case since 1974. This has resulted in sub- 
stantial shareholder unrest as well aa uncertainty in the capital markets. Early 
in 1976, some Mountain Fuel shareholders waged a proxy battle for control of 
the company, the central issue of which was the continued attack on the non- 
utility properties. The Commission in this case heard testimony that Mountain 
Fuel was unable to market a $20,000,000 common equity issuance of stock be- 
cause of this uncertainty, and that Wexpro has also been unable to engage in 
capital financing. 
Id. at 884. 
21. Utah P.S.C. Case No. 76-057-14 (April 11, 1978). See also 595 P.2d at 883-84 
(Wilkins J., dissenting). 
22. Utah P.S.C. Case No. 76-057-14 at 78-80. See also 595 P.2d at 873. 
23. 595 P.2d at 878 n.7. 
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defined, such person or corporation, and each thereof, is hereby 
declared to be a public utility and to be subject to the jurisdic- 
tion and regulation of the commission and to the provisions of 
this title? 
Relying on this exception, the majority reasoned that because 
Wexpro was performing activities facilitating natural gas pro- 
duction, it must be a utility whose oil assets would be subject to 
the commission's jurisdicti~n.~~ However, in so holding the ma- 
jority completely ignored the part of the statute that renders 
their argument incorrect. The above quoted definition of a pub- 
lic utility is immediately followed by this qualifying language: 
Any corporation or person not engaged in business exclusively 
as a public utility as hereinbefore defined shall be governed by 
the provisions of this title in respect only to the public utility 
or public utilities owned, controlled, operated or managed by it 
or by him, and not in respect to any other business or 
purs~it.~" 
The Wexpro functions classified by the commission as non-util- 
ity should fall within this qualification and thus be exempt from 
the commission's jurisdiction. 
The second theory relied upon by the majority was that 
Mountain Fuel's classification system was premised on an erro- 
neous assumption: that there was no connection between ex- 
ploraton expenses included in the ratebase and the ensuing ben- 
efits from the exploration program.a7 Hence, the majority 
espoused a classification system based upon the theory that cap- 
ital gain follows capital risk? This theory was set forth in Dem- 
ocratic Central Committee u. Washington Metropolitan Area 
Transit Commission (Central). a* In essence, the majority in 
Wexpro found that the risk of exploring for oil and gas is the 
risk of not finding oil and gas, i.e., finding dry holes. Because the 
ratepayers had paid the expense for all dry holes, they had 
borne the risk of Mountain Fuel's exploration program. After 
reaching this conclusion the court applied the theory of gain fol- 
lows risk, reasoning that because the ratepayers had borne the 
24. UTAH CODE ANN. 5 54-2-l(30) (1953). 
25. 595 P.2d at 878. 
26. UTAH CODE ANN. 5 54-2-l(30) (1953). 
27. 595 P.2d at 873. 
28. Id. at 874, 876-80. See also id. at 885-87, 893 (Wilkinn, J., dissenting). 
29. 485 F.2d 786 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
* 
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risk, they were entitled to any ensuing benefit?O That benefit in 
this instance was the right to have the oil revenues previously 
classified as non-utility included in the utility ratebase. The 
court then remanded the case to the commission with guidelines 
so explicit that the reclassification of the oil assets as utility 
property was assured." 
Justice Wilkins, in a vigorous dissent, argued that the ma- 
jority had exceeded its authority to review commission ordersF 
He set forth evidence supporting the order, including evidence 
that Mountain Fuel's exploration program had produced large 
quantities of low cost-of-service gasss resulting in one of the 
lowest gas rates in the c ~ u n t r y . ~  In addition, he showed evi- 
dence of shareholder unrest and the need for Mountain Fuel to 
maintain its ability to effectively raise capitals6 He then inferred 
from the evidence that the order was neither arbitrary nor 
capricious, and that both statute* and precedents7 required its 
-- 
30. 595 P.2d at 876-80. 
31. The majority held that if any one of the following questions was answered af- 
firmatively, the assets were to be considered utility property: 
(1) Was the property, while undeveloped, held in the utility capital ac- 
count . . . upon which a rate of return was paid by the ratepayers? 
(2) Were any funds from the utility exploration and development expense 
accounts . . . applied to the development of the acreage? 
(3) Has any natural gas or natural gas liquids been produced from the 
acreage? 
Id. at 878. Justice Wilkins, in his dissenting opinion, referred to these three questions as 
follows: 
Id. 
What alarms me, inter alia, ia that the Court today has actually deter- 
mined, I believe, that the transferred property is utility property, notwith- 
standing its decision to remand this case for an evidentiary hearing at which 
criteria for classification, in the form of three questions are to be employed. 
Just a facial reading of the majority opinion with these listed criteria and the 
undisputed evidence in this case convince me that the Court has determined 
today, without further hearing, that the subject property is utility. Why then, I 
ask, even though I think the Court ia in error, prolong the judicial process by 
requiring that further hearing. 
~t 890-91 (Wilkins, J., dissenting). 
32. Id. at 883-85. 
33. Id. at 882. 
34. Id. at 887. 
35. Id. at 884. 
36. Justice Wilkins cited UTAH CODE ANN. g 54-7-16 (1953) as support for his posi- 
tion. Id. at 884. 
37. Justice Wilkinn cited the following cases: Terra Util., Inc. v. Public Sew. 
Comm'n, 575 P.2d 1029 (Utah 1978); Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 547 
P.2d 199 (Utah 1976); Los Angeles & Salt Lake R.R. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 121 
Utah 209, 240 P.2d 493 (1952); Fuller-Topovce Truck Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 99 
Utah 28, 96 P.2d 722 (1939); Salt Lake Cit$ v. Utah Light and Traction Co., 52 Utah 
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8ffirman~e.~~ 
The Utah Supreme Court in Wexpro erroneously expanded 
the traditional limits of judicial review of regulatory orders and 
in the process shifted valuable property rights from owner-inves- 
tors to consumer -ratepayers. 
Regulating public service industries is an extremely complex 
and technical process. If the rights of both investors and con- 
sumers are to be protected, the process must be carried out by 
persons with proper technical understanding and exper t i~e .~~  
For this reason, public service commissions, which theoretically 
are composed of qualified persons, are given the authority and 
responsibility to regulate certain public service industries.'O Be- 
cause of the technical nature of such regulation, judicial review 
of commission orders should be carefully limited." The review- 
ing court should not substitute its findings for those of the com- 
mission merely because it deems the commission's findings to be 
unwise or undesirable.'% 
210, 173 P. 556 (1918). 595 P.2d at  884-85 (Wilkins, J., dissenting). 
38. Justice Wilkins stated, 
Evidence was received and reviewed by the Commission on all of the pro- 
posals submitted by all of the parties. The Commission substantially ruled in 
favor of that classification system propounded by Mountain Fuel, and there is 
evidence, in my judgment, to support that determination. As long as there is 
evidence to support its decision, the Commission may choose among proposals. 
Simply because Mountail Fuel's evidence appeared the more convincing is no 
reason for this Court to now conclude that the Commission abdicated its regu- 
latory responsibility and allowed Mountain Fuel to determine the scope of its 
jurisdiction. 
595 P.2d at  888 (Wilkins, J., dissenting). Justice Wilkins further distinguished Wexpro 
from Central by arguing that the majority had failed to recognize the difference between 
the accounting concepts of expense and capital. He also pointed out that the Central 
court applied the gain follows risk theory to assets that had always been utility property. 
Id. at  894. In addition, Justice Wilkins argued that the majority opinion constituted an 
unconstitutional taking of private property. This argument rests on the premise that the 
regulatory effect of the majority's holding is an unreasonable exercise of the state's police 
power. Id. a t  895-97. 
39. See United States v. Public Util. Comm'n, 158 F.2d 533 (D.C. Cir. 1946); Utah- 
Idaho Sugar Co. v. Intermountain Gas Co., 100 Idaho 368,597 P.2d 1058 (1979); Almeida 
Bus Lines, Inc. v. Department of Pub. Util., 348 Mass. 331, 203 N.E.2d 556 (1965). 
40. All 50 states have statutory provisions creating public service commissions 
(sometimes by another name, e.g. public utilities commission) and endowing them with 
regulatory power. 
41. E.g., American TeL & Tel. Co. v. United States, 299 U.S. 232 (1936); Nevada 
Power Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 589 F.2d 1002 (9th Cir. 1979); Southern Cal. Gas. 
Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 23 Cal. 3d 470,591 P.2d 34, 153 Cal. Rptr. 10 (1979); Colo- 
rado Mun. League v. Public Util. Comm'n, 597 P.2d 586 (Colo. 1979); Utah State Bd. of 
Regents v. Utah Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 583 P.2d 609 (Utah 1978). 
42. E-g., American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. United States, 299 U.S. 232 (1936); Giles Low- 
928 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I980 
The Wexpro court's reliance on Central is significant be- 
cause Central has also been viewed as erroneously extending the 
limits of judicial review." In Central, machinery and land that 
had been used as utility property were transferred to non-utility 
status as part of the plan to upgrade the District of Columbia 
mass transit system. These properties had appreciated substan- 
tially before the transfer." The public service commission or- 
dered that the appreciation on the machinery be applied to a 
utility account to the extent that depreciation had previously 
been expensed to that account.4s The remainder was to be 
credited to the  shareholder^.'^ The appreciation on the land was 
to be credited entirely to the shareholders." The United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed 
the commission's orders and awarded the ratepayers the in-ser- 
vice appreciation on both the machinery and the land. The court 
held that since the ratepayers had shouldered the risk of loss 
they were entitled to benefit from any gain or appre~iation.'~ 
This was the first time that a court had awarded ratepayers in- 
service appreciation on non-depreciable assets (land).'. In so 
holding, the court of appeals substituted its judgment for that of 
the Metropolitan Area Transit Commissi~n.~~ 
- -- -- 
ery Stockyards, Inc. v. Department of Agriculture, 565 F.2d 321 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 
436 U.S. 957 (1977); PBI Freight Sew. v. Public Sew. Comm'n, 598 P.2d 1352 (Utah 
1979); Utah Parks Co. v. Kent Frost Canyonland Tours, 19 Utah 2d 252, 430 P.2d 171 
(1967). 
43. See Note, Awarding In-service Appreciation to Public Utility Ratepayers- 
Windfall or Perdition?, 11 CALIF. W.L. REV. 160 (1974). 
44. 485 F.2d at 829-31. 
45. Id. at 794. This procedure would reduce the amount that ratepayers would have 
to contribute to the account. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. at 798. 
48. The court stated its rationale as follows: 
Since the investors may insist upon preservation of any investment they make 
in an asset to be used in the utility's operations, it is the ratepayers' burden to 
compensate them for the loss on their investment in the land. Accordingly, if 
the land no longer useful in utility operations is sold at  a profit, those who 
shouldered the risk of loss are entitled to benefit from the gain. 
k t  808 (footnotes omitted). See Note, supra note 43, at 110, 163. 
49. Judge MacKinnon, dissenting in Central, wrote: 
Outside the District, there is a paucity of cases and the few that are cited 
cannot directly support the action taken here. The majority observes the 
dearth of decided cases and seems to take this as a "license" to deal with the 
question as if writing on a clean slate. 
485 F.2d at 834 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
50. One commentator stated that Central "can be read as standing by implication 
for the proposition that the judiciary need give little weight to past commission practices 
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Until Wexpro came before the Utah Supreme Court, the 
court had historically avoided substituting its judgment for that 
of the commission. For example, in Utah Parks Company v. 
Kent Frost Canyonland Tours,61 the court wrote: "We have 
often stated that it is not within our province to pass upon the 
wisdom of the Commission's decisi~n."~~ The United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit stated this 
principle and its rationale as follows: "The process of public util- 
ity regulaton is fraught with sundry technical accounting, engi- 
neering, and financial policy considerations, that have been 
properly entrusted to the regulatory bodies, and if there is pro- 
duced '. . . no arbitrary result, our inquiry is at an end.' "6s 
Thus, the technical nature of the regulatory process has tradi- 
tionally mandated that it be carried out by persons with techni- 
cal expertise and ~nderstanding.~ 
The Wexpro court's erroneous application of the gain fol- 
lows risk theory suggests why legislatures and courts have 
deemed it prudent to narrowly restrict the judicial review of reg- 
ulatory orders. The Wexpro majority used the gain follows risk 
theory to classify assets as being either utility or non-utility. In 
Central, on the other hand, the assets in question were and al- 
ways had been classified as utility property; the gain follows risk 
doctrine was merely used as a basis for the allocation of capital 
gains on operating utility assets." The Utah Supreme Court 
should not have used the doctrine to transfer property rights 
from investors to consumers. This use of the doctrine does not 
reflect the proper relationship between consumers and investors. 
The United States Supreme Court set forth the correct relation- 
and established procedures when called upon to review commission findings." Note, 
supra note 43, at 160, 172. 
51. 19 Utah 2d 252, 430 P.2d 171 (1967). 
52. Id. at 254, 430 P.2d at  172. 
53. United States v. Public Util. Comm'n, 158 F.2d 533, 536 (D.C. Cir. 1946) (foot- 
note omitted). Judge Leventhal and Judge Bazelon, both of the D.C. Circuit, disagree as 
to the role of the judiciary in reviewing complex administrative agency decisions and the 
amount of deference that should be allowed the agency. While both agree that the judici- 
ary must not simply substitute its judgment for that of the agency, they do not agree on 
what scope of the underlying review of the agency's findings should be. For a more de- 
tailed discussion, see Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1,66,68 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (Bazelon, J., 
concurring at  66; Leventhal, J., concurring at 68), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976). 
54. See, e.g., Iowa-Illinois Gas and Elec. Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 19 Ill.2d 
436, 167 N.E.2d 414 (1960); Almeida Bus Lines, Inc. v. Department of Pub. Util., 348 
Mass. 331,203 N.E.2d 556 (1965); Public Serv. Comm'n v. Continental Tel. Co., 580 P.2d 
467, 470 (Nev. 1978). 
55. 485 F.2d at  805-22. 
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ship in Board of Public Utility Commissioners v. New York 
Telephone C O . : ~ ~  
Customers pay for service, not for the property used to 
render it. . . . By paying b i b  for service they do not acquire 
any interest, legal or equitable, in the property used for their 
convenience or in the funds of the company. Property paid for 
out of moneys received for service belongs to the company, just 
as does that purchased out of proceeds of its bonds and stock.57 
Even if the gain follows risk doctrine could properly be used 
to classify assets as utility or non-utility, it could not be accu- 
rately applied to Wexpro. The theory applies only when the risk 
is upon the ratepayer. The Wexpro court based its decision on 
the premise that the risk of exploring for oil and gas is the risk 
of not finding oil and gas. In traditional exploration programs, 
this premise would be valid since the risk of not finding oil and 
gas equates with the risk of loss of capital. In Wexpro, however, 
these two risks did not equate. The commission has stated: 
The risks of success of the exploration and development pro- 
gram are burdens which, in the f i s t  and last analyses, we place 
on the Company and its shareholders. If the program is unsuc- 
cessful or unproductive and does not yield new low cost natural 
gas reserves, it is not the utility customers that must account 
for such, but rather it is the Company, its management and its 
owners who must shoulder responsibility before this Commis- 
sion and in the capital markets.* 
The risk associated with any financial venture is the risk of los- 
ing money. The consumers never were exposed to this risk be- 
cause of the ever-present and watchful eye of the commission; 
only Mountain Fuel's shareholders bore the ultimate risk of los- 
ing money. Economic reality illustrates that the consumers were 
paying only for a service that they received: low-cost natural gas. 
They were not paying for the assets of the company, which is 
essentially what the majority opinion awarded them. 
The likely short-term effect of Wexpro, if followed by the 
commission on remand, will be a substantial reduction in Moun- 
tain Fuel's natural gas rates.6s However, because investors will 
56. 271 U.S. 23 (1926). 
57. Id. at 32. 
58. Utah P.S.C. Case No. 76-057-14 at 23. 
59. It is clear that rates will be substantially reduced because all of the heretofore 
non-utility oil profits, less a regulated rate of return on the oil assets, will reduce the 
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receive only a regulated rate of return on a high-risk venture, 
the cost of Mountain Fuel's capital undoubtedly will increase 
and exploration capital may become impossible to obtain.60 The 
long-term effect probably will be a depletion of the low-cost gas 
the current exploration program has generated. Also, because in- 
vestors are not likely to enter the risky field of oil and gas explo- 
ration for only a regulated rate of return, the future of Mountain 
Fuel's exploration program may be in jeopardy. When current 
natural gas reserves become exhausted, the company will proba- 
bly have to purchase its gas at  the market price, which in 1977 
was approximately 292.5% higher than the internal cost-of-ser- 
vice price.61 This will cause a substantial and permanent in- 
crease in natural gas rates for Mountain Fuel consumers. There- 
fore, as a result of the Utah Supreme Court substituting its 
judgment for that of the commission, investors lost their rights 
to non-utility assets, and consumers may eventually have to pay 
much higher natural gas rates. 
Perhaps even more significant is the effect that Wexpro 
may have as precedent. The Wexpro court extended the limits 
of judicial review of regulatory orders even further than the 
Central court did. This further opening of the door of judicial 
intervention may apply to all regulated industries; however, it 
poses a particular danger to natural *gas utilities. As artificial 
pressures drive the cost of hydrocarbons upward, attempts to re- 
lieve consumers of this added financial burden will increase both 
in number and intensity. Courts, anxious to protect consumers, 
can rely on the latitude provided by Wexpro to bypass the 
consumers' contribution on a dollar-for-dollar basis. Unfortunately, lower rates may en- 
courage increased gas consumption, despite the public policy favoring conservation. 
60. Cf. 595 P.2d at 884 (Wilkins, J., dissenting) (The earlier commission order "roll- 
ing in" the oil properties resulted in suspension of trading of Mountain Fuel Stock and 
threatened Mountain Fuel's capital generally). 
61. Id. at 882. This figure is obtained by the following formula: 
Market Price 
x 100 
Cost of Service Price 
1977 Market price = $1.17 per Mcf (thousand cubit feet) 
1977 Cost-of-service price = $.40 per Mcf (approximately) 
1.17 
- x 100 = 292.5% 
.40 
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regulatory system. The results of bypassing this system begin as 
temporary benefits, but eventually become permanent 
disadvantages. 
Kenneth M. Anderson 
